





Volume 31, Issue 4 
  




Erik Figueiredo  
UFPB and CNPq researcher 
Abstract 
This paper measures unfair inequality in Brazil using the "responsibility-sensitive" fairness principle. The results show 
that the levels of fairness in Brazil did not decrease as much as the income concentration levels for the period.
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1. Introduction
The Brazilian economy has been put through remarkable changes in the past
few decades. Trade liberalization, price level stabilization and the consequent
development of a favorable environment for the adoption of income transfer
programs led to a series of non-negligible economic eﬀects, among which
changes in the income distribution framework, characterized by improvement
in social indicators (e.g., income concentration, poverty, and welfare) are of
special note.1
According to a strict egalitarian fairness ideal, this scenario allows con-
cluding that Brazil has become a fairer country. However, not even modern
egalitarians, such as Rawls (1971), regard perfect equality as an ideal pa-
rameter for fairness. Inspired by the Rawlsian tradition, authors such as
Sen (1985) and Roemer (1998) advocate that income varies (is unequal) as
a function of diﬀerent needs, eﬀorts, or preferences.
A usual criterion described in the literature assumes that individuals’
outcomes are determined by “responsibility” and “nonresponsibility” factors
(Roemer, 1998). In other words, part of an individual’s income is the result of
her eﬀort (e.g., investment in human capital), also known as “responsibility”
factors; another part of the income is inﬂuenced by circumstances (e.g., social
background), also known as nonresponsibility factors.
An indirect implication of this criterion is that only inequality caused
by diﬀerences in circumstances, or in nonresponsibility factors, is socially
undesirable (Devooght, 2008). Based on these arguments, the egalitarian
rule is relegated to second place, giving rise to the “responsibility-sensitive”
principle of fairness.
Therefore, the relationship between continued reduction in Brazil’s in-
come inequality and greater social justice is brought into debate, given that
a possible disregard for eﬀort inequalities is likely to steer the country into a
rather unfair scenario.
The aim of this study is to measure the level of unfairness in Brazil be-
tween 1995 and 2009. To do that, the present paper uses the “responsibility-
sensitive” concept proposed by Bossert (1995), Konow (1996), and Cappelen
& Tungodden (2007), and the distance measure between the fairness rule and
the observed income inequality developed in Cowell (1980).
2. Method and Empirical Strategy
This section introduces the criterion for the determination of the fairness
rule proposed by Bossert (1995), Konow (1996), and Cappelen & Tungodden
1See Figueiredo & Ziegelmann (2009).
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(2007), and the statistical method for the measurement of unfair.
2.1 Individual Fairness Levels
Consider a society with N = f1;:::;ng individuals. Each individual i is
characterized by a pair (yi;zi), where yi is the observed income and zi is the
fair income. Bearing in mind an egalitarian society, the fairness parameter
is denoted by zi = , with  = n 1 P
i yi. In other words, deviations of
the observed income from the distribution’s mean income, ui = yi   zi are
considered to be unfair.
The main problem with this criterion is that it does not take into account
the diﬀerences in merit among individuals. Because of this limitation, let us
assume that the current income yi of individual i is a function of responsibility
and nonresponsibility (or environment) factors, respectively ri and ei, so that
yi = f(ri;ei) (Roemer, 1998). Following Bossert (1995), Konow (1996), and










i yi is the sum of income in society, subscript i and j indicate that
the variable belongs to individual i and j, respectively, and the individual’s







As already deﬁned, f(ri;ei) is the income of an individual with responsi-
bility characteristics ri and nonresponsibility characteristics ei. Thus, f(ri;ej)
is the virtual income of a person with the responsibility characteristics of per-
son i and the nonresponsibility characteristics of person j. That is, an indi-
vidual’s claim is given by what the average income in a hypothetical situation
would have been if everyone had the same responsibility factors as this indi-
vidual. Hence, an individual’s claim not depends on the non-responsibility
factors of all the individuals in the economy, but only on the individual’s own
responsibility factors (Almås, 2008).
Empirically, f(ri;ei) will be estimated by the log-linear equation:
logyi = ri + ei + i: [2]
However, some remarks need to be made on its speciﬁcation. First, it is
not always possible to have a well deﬁned set of variables (ri) and (ei), such
as information on family background. So, the major problem with (2) is the
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treatment given to error term (i) which, in theory, represents brute luck,
but now includes both responsibility and nonresponsibility factors owing to
the omission of relevant variables.
Thus, Devooght (2008) uses a normative criterion which includes (i) in
the set of compensation variables (ei). That is, logf(ri;ei) = ri + i, with








Parameter (3) is built upon the following concept of fairness: popula-
tion groups are deﬁned according to their responsibility variables, and any
within-group inequality is deemed unfair. This means that if hours worked
is regarded as the only responsibility parameter, ri, all individuals who work
the same number of hours should have the same income level. If this pattern
is broken, any income inequality will be unfair (see Devooght, 2008, Almås,
2008, and Almås et al., 2010).
2.2 Distance between Distributions
As soon as the fairness rule is concerned, one should ﬁnd a tool that can
measure its distance from the observed income inequality. As stressed in
Devooght (2008), this type of investigation requires an indicator that sets
itself apart from the anonymity principle. It is then suggested that the
distance measures between distributions, initially proposed by Cowell (1980),
be used.
Hence, let y and z be the current and fair distributions, respectively.
As shown in Cowell (1980, 1985) and Jenkins and O’Higgins (1989), for
construction, both distributions have an equal mean ( =  z). Thus, the










;  6= 0;1: [4]
Where  is a sensitivity parameter. When  ! 1, sensitivity to changes
is heightened in the upper tail of the distribution; otherwise,  !  1,
sensitivity is greater in the lower tail of the distribution. Usually, for  ! 0;1,
we have:















j Dj is a constant,
this simpliﬁes to Ci=
P
h Ch (Almås, 2008).



























For a z equal to distribution mean , J(y;z) converges to the Theil mean
log deviation index.
3. Results
The data used in this study were obtained from the Brazilian National House-
hold Survey (PNAD). The collected data refer to information on male house-
hold heads, or spouse, aged 25 to 65 years, who lived in urban areas of all
Brazilian regions.
The analysis is carried out as follows: i) the earnings equations are es-
timated to obtain the parameters of the log-linear equation (2). An OLS
regression is considered, using the logarithm of real income of all work as
dependent variable and years of schooling, working hours, migration dummy,
and experience (deﬁned as age - years of schooling - 6), as explanatory vari-
ables (responsibility); ii) then, rules (3) are calculated, considering the error
as compensation variable; iii) ﬁnally, the unfairness level is inferred using the
class of distance measures.
The calculation of distance measures (5 and 6) for years 1995 to 2009 is
summarized in Table 1. The results in the ﬁrst column, J0(y;z), indicate
that the distance between current income and the fairness rule fell by 6%
between 1995 and 2009. This decrease is small compared to that of the Theil
index (around 16%) in the same period. Nevertheless, the results are diﬀerent
when a greater weight is given to the upper tail of the distribution, J1(y;z).
In this case, the distance between the current and fair distributions increases
by approximately 13%.
These results allow building three scenarios for the analyzed period: 1)
under strict equality, Brazil has become a fairer country; 2) with the use of
a responsibility-sensitive fairness rule and an indicator with heavier weight
on the lower tail of the distribution, the fairness level improved, but was still
lower than that in scenario 1; 3) when the upper tail of the distribution is
given a greater weight, the country becomes fairer.
To corroborate these results, distance measures (4) were calculated using
sensitivity parameters  =  1;2. That was achieved by giving the lower
and upper tails of the distribution heavier weights, respectively. The results
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Table 1: Inequality Levels: Unfairness and Theil Index– 1995-2009
Brazil
Year J0(y;z) J1(y;z) Theil
1995 0.3389 0.0744 0.5377
1996 0.3172 0.0721 0.5244
1997 0.3380 0.0730 0.5302
1998 0.3301 0.0768 0.5300
1999 0.3245 0.0732 0.5287
2001 0.3303 0.0768 0.5236
2002 0.3334 0.0781 0.5242
2003 0.3296 0.0800 0.5134
2004 0.3301 0.0798 0.4989
2005 0.3283 0.0806 0.4958
2006 0.3109 0.0746 0.4875
2007 0.3081 0.0722 0.4683
2008 0.3129 0.0785 0.4607
2009 0.3181 0.0839 0.4524
Note: With error term included in
nonresponsibility variables.
did not change signiﬁcantly, though. Distance J 1(y;z) showed a decrease
of around 8%, from 0.6302 in 1995 to 0.5830 in 2009. On the other hand,
J2(y;z) increased by nearly 9% (from 0.8470 in 1995 to 0.9291 in 2009).3
Regardless of the distance measure, the unfairness level did not decline as
signiﬁcantly as the levels of inequality did. This behavior was unexpected, as
a more equal income distribution is necessarily believed to be fairer. Under
a more speciﬁc approach, it could be stated that income transfer programs,
implemented after economic stabilization, are eﬃcient in reducing inequality
and poverty levels, as advocated by Barros et al. (2001), but they do not
eliminate unfairness.
This behavior might result from the fact that the design of Brazilian
public policies (ﬁscal, educational, or income transfers) overlooks fairness
elements. These issues are not dealt with in the international literature,
except in Aaberge & Colombino (2011), Betts & Roemer (2005), Fleurbaey
& Maniquet (2011), among others.
3It is important to highlight that the measure is sensitive to the choice of . The
diﬀerence between the measures is also reported by Cowel et al. (2009).
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4. Final Remarks
This study sought to measure the level of unfairness in Brazil between 1995
and 2009. To do that, a responsibility-sensitive fairness rule, as proposed
by Bossert (1995), Konow (1996), and Cappelen & Tungodden (2007), and
the distance measure between the fairness rule and the observed income in-
equality, as developed in Cowell (1980), were used. The results reveal that
the determination of the fairness level of the Brazilian economy relies on
normative choices. Under strict equality, Brazil has become a fairer coun-
try. However, this conclusion does not hold when a responsibility-sensitive
fairness rule is adopted.
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